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Notes Toward a Formal
Model of Common Law
M.B.W. SINCLAIR*
This paper outlines steps towards a formal set theoretic model of common
law. It is the result of an investigation begun out of curiosity alone; could
the basic notions of common law be captured in the kind of set theoretic
analysis that has been used so productively by Montague,' Cresswell, 2 and
others in the semantics of natural language? If so, our understanding of
common law and the possibility of its mechanization would be considerably
advanced. If not, the reasons should prove illuminating. Either way the
investigation of the formal properties of the relations involved, in particular
of the precedent relation, should be useful. It turned out that it is possible
to go quite a long way toward such a formalization, but that in two critical
respects the model is not deterministic.3 A formal model of common law
decision making, however, should isolate its indeterminacies and precisely
delineate the roles played out by these indeterminacies.
The characteristic question that the common law judge must answer is
whether the factual situation before her falls under some particular legal
predicate. 4 That is, is this situation a battery, breach of contract, etc.? By
the time a judge is faced with this intrinsically legal question the facts of
the case, the events on which the dispute is founded, have already been
determined by jury (or by judge in a bench trial). 5 Of course actual events
are neither before the court nor determined by it; rather, a linguistic rep-
resentation of them is settled as accurate. 6 Accordingly, the facts of a case
are comprised of a set of propositions, each determining some particular
* Assistant Professor, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington
1. R. MONTAGUE, FomAL PImosopHy 188-270 (R. Thomason ed. 1974).
2. M. CREsswELL, LoGics AND LANGUAGES (1973).
3. This is hardly surprising. One should not expect stable and precise expressions of
substantive content in a formal model of common law; on the contrary, a model that was
substantively deterministic would be ipso facto inadequate.
4. Statutes and constitutions also generate legal predicates and delimit their application.
This paper, however, focuses on common law predicates, a rather messier and less determinate
lot. There is nothing magical about common law predicates. They are merely words that have
proved convenient for the collection and classification of prior decisions and which have thus
worked their way into the language of common law.
5. Of course the division between the functions of jury and judge are not precisely
demarcated; even in his formal role the judge has a great influence over what facts a jury can
find, for example, in controlling discovery, in deciding the admissibility of evidence, and in
his instructions to the jury. For present purposes the simplification used here is justifiable for
model building, but is more appropriate to the appellate level.
6. Sinclair, The Semantics of Common Law Predicates, 61 IND. L.J. 373, 378-79 (1985).
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fact. The judge must decide whether the conjunction of these propositions
is an instance of the legal predicate in question.'
The common law, unlike statutory law, contains no codified rule for the
ascription of a legal predicate to a set of facts. It does not "admit the
possibility of a court, however elevated, reaching a final, authoritative state-
ment of what the law is in a general abstract sense." 8 At common law, a
judge must decide for each case whether or not it instantiates a particular
legal predicate. This decision is essentially a stipulation; the judge stipulates
that this particular set of facts does or does not instantiate the legal pred-
icate. 9 But, just because the decision is a stipulation, it does not follow that
the judge is free of legal constraint in making it.10 The doctrine of stare
decisis is the central feature of common law that constrains judges and lends
a crucial element of stability and predictability to the common law. Ac-
counting for the role of stare decisis in judicial decision making is therefore
the central problem in explaining common law.
No two cases are identical in all respects. The facts presented to the court
in any given instance are unique, being at least spatio-temporally distinct
and usually involving different persons." All cases which have not previously
been decided are therefore distinguishable on some grounds from all decided
cases. Conversely, there is some respect in which any two cases are indis-
tinguishable. To say that some distinctions are trivial is merely to beg the
question of triviality. Only under some criterion of similarity can any two
cases be held similar or distinguished.
There is therefore a certain complexity in the structure of the idea of
justice. We may say that it consists of two parts: a uniform or constant
feature, summarized in the precept 'Treat like cases alike' and a shifting
or varying criterion used in determining when, for a given purpose, cases
are alike or different.1
2
It is the second feature, the criterion of similarity and difference, that is
the most crucial determinant of the precedent relation, stare decisis.
For every established legal predicate, the judge has access to a number
7. There is neither an authoritatively determined set of common law predicates nor any
determinate method for discovering them. One could, however, make a more or less serviceable
list to which a judge would be free to add as she found necessary. An example of a possible
addition is the proposed tort of "satiric appropriation." Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the
Law of Libel, Trademark, and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U.L. REy. 923
(1985).
8. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
77, 90 (A.W.B. Simpson 2d ed. 1973).
9. See Sinclair, supra note 6, at 387-89.
10. Indeed one of the most significant and contentious theses at large in jurisprudence today
is that it is completely legally constrained. See Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CH. L.
REv. 14 (1967); Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972). This
dispute does not affect the formally stipulative nature of the judge's decision.
II. Cases of res judicata are the obvious exception and are the limiting situation for the
analysis presented here. See Sinclair, supra note 6, at 390.
12. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 156 (1961).
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of reported judicial opinions presenting a set of facts, a holding that those
facts do or do not instantiate that predicate, and a justification. If, within
that set of cases, there is one with facts relevantly identical to those before
the judge, then the decision has already been made. The precedent determines
the decision of the instant case. However, the question always at large is,
what is the appropriate criterion of relevant identity between the case at
issue and any one of those already decided? As no two cases are identical
in all respects, answering this question is an inescapable judicial responsi-
bility, and a prerequisite to a claim of precedential control.
The judge's selection of the applicable criterion of relevant identity does
not automatically determine which prior decisions are of precedential import.
Just as cases may be similar or distinct according to the criterion of similarity
used, so also it is with facts, the elemental components of cases. Although
the present judge has no power to change the facts of a prior case, she can
decide which of those facts are now important and in what way. 3 Whether
a given fact is of significance to a decision or irrelevant will depend upon
the criterion of similarity in use. ' 4 The choice of criterion rests upon the
present judge, and, although no doubt influenced by the dicta of earlier
opinions, this choice is not controlled by precedent. The importance of facts
to prior decisions as well as to the present decision is thus determined by
the present judge.
This is the second respect in which the common law decision is under-
determined by precedent and facts. Not only must the judge choose a criterion
of similarity in order to determine the applicability of prior decisions, she
must also use that criterion to determine the significance of facts within
both those prior decisions and the case to be decided. A formal analysis
must account for both indeterminacies in the system of common law.
In the following the variable "c" ranges over cases, or, more precisely,
the facts of cases as determined by courts; "c," thus picks out some particular
set of facts of a case. The notation "L" is used for the set of legal predicates,
"Ll' for a particular one of them.' 5 Schematically then the intrinsically legal
question facing the judge is of the form "Is c, an LT?" where ci is the set
of facts comprising the case to be decided and L, is the legal predicate.
The set of cases in which it was decided that a given predicate, L,, does
apply shall be called the "precedent set of Li," and for convenience the set
of cases in which it was decided that L, does not apply shall be called the com-
plement of the precedent set.'" Let "P" designate the set of all cases already
13. For a striking example of a judge's rearranging of facts, even within the same case,
see Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 694-97 (1976); cf. Davis v.
Paul, 505 F.2d 1180, 1181 (6th Cir. 1974).
14. This argument is set forth in more detail in Sinclair, supra note 6, at 393-95.
15. The set of legal predicates is hierarchically ordered. For example, battery is a tort, and
both "tort" and "battery" are members of L-but this is of no special consequence at this
stage. Legal predicates may be specified by a list but that list would, of course, not be closed.
16. Obviously it is not a true complement. Also, neither the precedent set nor its complement
is necessarily consistent.
1987]
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decided. It is divided into subsets (not necessarily exclusive) according to
the predicates under which its members were decided; let "P'." designate the
precedent set of Li and " P Li" its complement. Let "J" designate the set of
courts and "J" the set of courts of status i (trial, appellate .... according to
the system). The set of decided cases P, and the precedent sets and com-
plements, PLi and PLi, are divided into subsets according to the courts that
decided those cases.17
The notation "R" shall be used for the precedent relation. It is the relation
that obtains between two cases, one of which must precede the other in time
and in some way have influence over the decision of the other. A common
law system, such as is in operation in some areas of the law in most of the
states of the United States, is a 4-tuple, < L, J, P, R > where L, J, P,
and R are as set forth above.
The next step is to set up the analysis in such a way as to provide an
empirically adequate explication of the nature of the precedent relation, R.
The analysis that follows is along lines suggested by David Lewis' counterpart
theory.'8 Qualms about quantifying over possible worlds are not relevant
here where only cases are involved. Some scruples might be bothered by
hypothetical and future cases and, more seriously, by quantifying over the
kinds of things here called facts (the propositions accepted as correct by the
court).' 9 As to the existence of these "facts," discourse within common
law systems simply does carry ontological commitment to representations
of facts as fundamental elements of all c (most notably all c; in PLi U P L)"
However, the reader might perfer to construct facts out of individuals and
events using the methods of categorial grammars."0 Using counterpart
theory as a model also makes it possible to avoid using modal operators,
a desirable feature if one is looking toward the possibility of mechanized
analysis.
The variables x, y, z, . . . ,range over the particular facts the conjunctions
17. Standard logic and set theory notations are used throughout. Thus: 'U' for set union
(i.e., "PUQ" means "set P, set Q, or both"); '<' and '>' surround ordered sequences; '-'
is the truth functional negation of propositional logic and can be read "it is not the case that
..."; '.' is the truth functional conjutetion of propositional logic; 'v' is the truth functional
disjunction of propositional logic; 'D' is the truth functional conditional of propositional logic;
'-' is the truth functional bi-conditional of propositional logic; '(x)', the universal quantifier,
can be read "for all x .. . "; '3 x', the existential quantifier, can be read "for some x ..."
or "there is an x such that . . ."; '=' is an abbreviation for "is identical to" and '#' is an
abbreviation for "is not identical to."
18. Lewis, Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic, 65 J. PHIL. 113 (1968).
19. A Meinongian analysis along the lines of Parsons, A Prolegomenon to Meinongian
Semantics, 71 J. PHIL. 561, 561-79 (1974), might be useful in drawing the full range of
distinctions needed. On this view a "case" would be, roughly, any set of facts (any proposition)
and would thus allow hypothetical and future cases to be considered. The concept would be
detailed in much the same way as a Meinongian object. Then actual cases that got before
courts would be called something else, say "suits." To every suit there would be a correlate
case. While this avenue appears promising, the author has yet to pursue it further.
20. See M. CRESSWELL, supra note 2; R. MONTAGUE, supra note 1.
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of which comprise cases. "x e c." is an abbreviation for "x is a fact in ci;"
"Sxy" is an abbreviation for "x is counterpart of y;" "ciIkcj" is an abbre-
viation for "c, is relevantly identical (under the criterion Ik) to Cj."
To use a case in the precedent set it is first necessary to establish some
relationship between that case and the one to be decided. The concept of
"counterpart" is intended to capture this relation between the elements of
the cases. However, the relationship between elements of cases, like the
relationship between cases, is to be determined by the judge in the case to
be decided. It is not given deterministically in the holdings or the dicta of
prior cases. Accordingly the counterpart relation is variable according to
purpose and the criteria adopted by the court. 2'
The notation "I" has been introduced for criteria of relevant identity and
"Ik" for a particular criterion. Relevant identity can be seen either as de-
termining the sum of the counterpart relations, or as the set of principles
or general moral precepts under which the counterpart relations can be
subsumed. 22
The analysis proceeds by setting forth the properties of the counterpart
relation, S, and then building relevant identity, 1k, out of it. These basic
notions are then used to construct a model of stare decisis using the precedent
relation, R.
1.
-(( Iy)( aIc)(yEc, . Syx)
There does not have to be counterpart for every fact.
2.
- (x)(c,)(c) ((ec,. xEc,)D (c, = c,))
It is not necessarily true that a fact cannot be in more than one case.
3.
(x)(y)(Sxy D (9c,)(xec)
Counterparts can be found only in cases.
4. (x)(y)(SXY :) (El i )(yEci))
Whatever has a counterpart is in a case.
5.
(x)(y)(c)((xec,. yEc,. (E z)(Sxz. Syz)) D (x = y))
A fact has at most one counterpart in a given case.
6.
(ci)xec; D Sxx)
In a case any fact is its own counterpart - S is reflexive.
21. If necessary "S" could be subscripted-S,,S.. .- to distinguish different choices that
may be made.




-(x)(cd)(XECi D (H y)(yc. Syx))
For any two cases there is not necessarily a counterpart in one of any
element in the other. 23
8.
-(x)Cy)(c)(c)((xfc,. -y~cj. Sxy. i#: j)D
(FI w)(Rz)(wIci . zEcj . w # x . z * y . Swz))
Just because one fact in c, is counterpart of one fact in cj it does not
necessarily follow that any of the other facts of c are counterparts of any
of the other facts of cj.
9.(c)(c)(((X)(Ry)(x~c, . yEc. . Syx) . (y)(alx)(XEc, . yec-i . Sxy)) D (cIlkc))
Two cases are relevantly identical if their elements can be matched as
counterparts. This expresses the idea of relevant identity as the sum of the
counterpart relations.
It has been noted above that counterpart relations are not fixed and
invariate, but rather, are determined by the judge in a particular case as
consequences of her choice of criterion of relevant identity. The deduction
of particular counterpart relations from the chosen criterion of relevant
identity, consistent with the general social and moral principles supporting
that choice, is the province of legal argument. It is essentially the question
of how these particular facts bear upon the principle in question. It is thus
not necessarily truth functional. 24
As a result two cases might be relevantly identical when only one fact in
one case stands arguably in a counterpart relation to a fact in the other case
for any prima facie significant exogenous purpose. In such a situation all
the other facts are arbitrarily matched up as "ceteris paribus counterparts."
This situation is the clearest illustration of the normal conceptual priority
of relevant identity over the counterpart relation. It might appear that this
requirement would be better expressed with a filter (a "most if not all"
quantifier) rather than the universal quantifier, but this would be incorrect.
Under any given social or moral principle as criterion of identity, indefinitely
many facts are going to be of no differential consequence whatever, and
thus ceteris paribus expresses not neglect but the appropriate counterpart
relation.2 5 It follows therefore that:
23. But see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). To the extent that it found state action
in the requirement of resort to courts for ultimate enforcement, it provides a counter example
to postulate (7).
24. Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory,
57 U. CoLo. L. Ray. 45, 45-115 (1985).
25. See Sinclair, supra note 6, at 393-95. That argument suggests that postulate 10 is the
only acceptable form.
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10.
(c )(i )(cilc j D ((k)(El y)(xec .yecyj. Syx) . (y)CS X)(xecI .yECy . Sxy)))
Clearly postulates (9) and (10) can be combined in the form:
11.
(c)(c)(((x)(R y)(xEci , yEcj. Syx) . (y)C(x)(xeci .-yecj. Sxy))=
CAkC)
Postulate 11-and thus also the appropriateness of 9 and/or 10-should
be contentious. Resjudicata is derivable from postulate 6 and either postulate
9 or postulate 11 where i=j. This can be expressed as the theorem:
12.
(c,)(cj)(ck)((c1mc, . c Imck) D cjIc)
Transitivity of relevant identity. For this to hold it is necessary to look
at the three cases under only one criterion of similarity. If, however, the
criteria of similarity are different-say the criterion between c and ck is the
one used in c., but not the one being used in ci, the case under consideration-
then clearly transitivity will not necessarily obtain. Thus:
13.
- (cj)(c)(ck)((m # n) D ((cjIcj. cjfc,) D cIck))
14.
(x)(y)(z)(Sxy. Syz D Sxz)
Transitivity of the counterpart relation. Again this will hold only for a
particular counterpart relation, that is, only under a particular criterion of
relevant identity. It is similar in this way to postulates 12 and 13. Difference
in counterpart relation, however, does not follow automatically from dif-
ference in criterion of similarity.
There remains the explication of R, the precedent relation, in terms of
the concept of relevant identity developed above. Clearly R is a relation
between cases, typically one being decided under a given predicate and one
in the precedent set of that predicate or its complement. R is also not a
single relation but a complex of a range of relations, from binding through
persuasive precedent. It shall be assumed for the sake of simplicity that there
are three strengths of precedential power. Numerical subscripts indicate these
different strengths.
For a given case ci under a given predicate L. before a given court Jk
there will be three accesibility relations 26 with PLj U P Lj. These relations are
functions because the sets of cases picked out by them are uniqure.
26. Kripke, Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic, 16 ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA
83 (1963). This model quantifies over cases (as world theory does over possible worlds) and
thus avoids the need for modal operators. Accessibility is thus a relation among cases and will
facilitate standard analyses of subjunctives such as: "Had this been decided then . . ."; "If c
had been decided thus-and-so, then ...."
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R,: (binding precendent) for a given court J., case c;, and predicate Li,
R, picks out the set of cases in P such that if any c1 in that set is relevantly
identical to ci (i.e., if c*IcJ, where I, has been determined to be the cri-
terion of relevant identity) then Ji must follow the decision made for c1.
Since R, is a function, R
, 
(< Ji,c, Li >) is the subset of PL, U P . de-
cided by courts higher in the hierarchy than J.
R2: (strongly persuasive precedent) the same as for R, but with "must
have good reason not to" for "must" and "of equal status" for "higher."
R3: (persuasive precedent) the same as for R, but with "should take ac-
count of" for "must" and "of lower status" for "higher."
R: is the set of all precedential relations."
It follows that stare decisis, the doctrine of precedent, will be expressed by:
15.
(ci)(cj)((c.,cj . cjeR(< J,, c, Li>)) -: (Lici- (Lic =-Licj))2 8
The precedent relation, R, depends upon the judge's having chosen anp
appropriate criterion of relevant identity and having used that criterion to
order and relate the facts comprising the case before her. 29 These deter-
minations are based upon information and reasoning exogenous to the com-
mon law itself. How the judge decides is thus not determined by the common
law itself. Ethics, economics, social science, and political considerations are
of continuing and unavoidable relevance to the common law decision. 0 It
is clear, even in this most formal analysis, that the force of the doctrine of
precedent is, as H.L.A. Hart saw, 3 coextensive with the force of justice.
27. It might be noted that this is exactly as in the analysis of a discourse in common
language. The triple <J., c., L.> is the base world and R,, R2, and R3.
, 
together form a complex
accessibility relation. Tile properties of this accessibility relation are derived empirically from
the nature of the discourse in both the analysis of common language discourse and this analysis
of common law. What's more, being empirical phenomena they sometimes go awry. This
happens, for example, when there are two cases in a precedent set that are apparently relevantly
identical but which have been decided differently. The extraordinary contortions a court or
law professor will go through to "reconcile" them are familiar. Rather than showing something
wrong with this theory, this is in fact quite strong evidence for it. It is hardly surprising that
courts using different criteria of relevant identity should come to different conclusions on facts
indistinguishable on either or on a third criterion.
28. Notice that where c, = c, it cannot be deduced from postulate 15 and the resjudicata
theorem, (c)(ciIkc), that: cER(<J,, c,, Li>). (Such a tempting inference would rest on the
confirmation of the consequent, a standard fallacy.) Intuitively, the reason is that a case yet
to be decided is not precedent for itself or for any other case and is thus not in the range of
any precedent relation. The doctrine of precedent cannot therefore be expressed with the
biconditional rather than the conditional. This is an altogether expectable result.
29. A judge who is firmly convinced that a relevantly identical precedent was decided
wrongly might simply refuse to follow it. That is not to deny the power of precedent, so
it would be wrong to account for it in a model of common law.
30. In those areas of law and during those periods in which there is substantial stability of
the relevant social and moral principles and of the relation of classes of facts to them, this
kind of analysis could yield a stable, machine processable, decision procedure. However the
usefulness of such a device would be continually in doubt: has something changed in the real
world to upset that essential stability? If so, how could the device tell?
31. H.L.A. HART, supra note 12, at 155-56.
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Although the analytic system used could lend itself to mechanization, its
application shows two levels of uncertainty: (i) the appropriate criterion of
similarity between cases; and (ii) the ordering and hence the relative signif-
icance of the facts of the case and precedent cases in question. So the judicial
decision is always underdetermined by the facts of the case and the precedents
no matter how extensive they may be.
An empirical system can cope with one uncertainty and still be determin-
istic, but these two layers of uncertainty make the indeterminacy of the
common law decision systematic. The problem is analogous to that of the
intrinsic indeterminacy of the maxim "aim at the greatest good for the
greatest number." One can maximize the good for a given number or
maximize the number who get a given good, but not both.3 2 The judge
cannot, without an exercise of judgment, determine both the impact of
precedent and the relevance of the facts.
The most interesting result of this exercise in formal model building is
that it makes clear that this double uncertainty is inescapable. A judge must,
unavoidably, make a decision, and these same intrinsic indeterminacies that
make judicial deciding unavoidable also cast doubt on the possibility of a
useful mechanization of common law. 31
32. Technically it is described as having two maximands and only one degree of freedom.
The problem is easily seen in the instruction: stand outside the law school and pick out the
greatest number of tallest students.
33. Contra Stone-de Montpensier, The Compleat Wrangler, 50 MIN. L. REv. 1001, 1001-
25 (1966); Logic and Law: The Precedence of Precedents, 51 MINN. L. REv. 655, 655-74 (1966-
67). Stone-de Montpensier argued that the common law is comprised of a set of rules deducible
from an axiomatic basis and thus could be formalized and deterministic. He also argued,
however, that the system would necessarily be incomplete, citing Godel (although he did not
explain why we should think Godel's theorem relevant to such a system).
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